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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3595 
___________ 
 
GARY E. VAUGHN, JR., 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
TONIA N. VAUGHN; MUSTANG SALOON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-00243) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: January 4, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Gary Vaughn appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint for lack of 
diversity jurisdiction.  We will affirm. 
 Gary Vaughn initiated this action in 2014 while incarcerated at F.C.I. Fort Dix in 
New Jersey,1 alleging that his wife, Tonia, who is domiciled in Pennsylvania, violated 
their pre-nuptial agreement.  Prior to his incarceration, Gary was domiciled with Tonia 
and their son in Pennsylvania.  On September 29, 2015, the District Court dismissed 
Vaughn’s complaint for lack of diversity jurisdiction, finding him to be a citizen of 
Pennsylvania, and rejecting his “attempts to claim Maine citizenship on the basis of an 
alleged future intent to reside there.”  Following the District Court’s denial of his motion 
for reconsideration, this timely appeal ensued. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of diversity jurisdiction.  See Frett-
Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2008).  Historical or chronological data 
which underline a court’s determination are subject to the clearly erroneous rule, and we 
“will not disturb the judgment of the District Court unless we are left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed in the District Court's 
factfinding.”  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
                                              
1 Gary Vaughn is currently serving a 72-month sentence imposed by the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania on money laundering and related charges.  Gary and Tonia are awaiting 
trial on separate money laundering charges in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
where Tonia is currently on pre-trial release. 
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 There is no dispute that Tonia is domiciled in Pennsylvania.  Therefore, as the 
proponent of diversity jurisdiction, and admitted citizen2 of Pennsylvania prior to his 
incarceration, Gary Vaughn must “initially carry the burden of production to rebut the 
presumption in favor of an established domicile” – Pennsylvania – and then “carry the 
burden of persuasion by proving that a change of domicile occurred, creating diversity of 
citizenship.”  McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2006).  
He must meet both burdens with a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 290.  And 
though a citizen can change his domicile instantly, “[t]o do so . . . he must take up 
residence at the new domicile, and he must intend to remain there.  Neither the physical 
presence nor the intention to remain is alone sufficient.”  Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 
1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 Here, Vaughn contends that he “clearly meets the standard of rebuttal for 
citizenship with the averment that upon release, he would be returning to the State of 
Maine.”  But “[i]t is the citizenship of the parties at the time the action is commenced 
which is controlling,” and Vaughn’s mere expression of intent to take up residence in 
Maine, without more, is insufficient to establish his domicile there.3  Id.  Because he has 
                                              
2 Citizenship and domicile are synonymous terms for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 
McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
3 Vaughn relies on Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App'x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010), where a panel 
of this Court in a non-precedential opinion observed that “the domicile of a prisoner 
before his imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.  
That presumption, however, may be rebutted by showing a bona fide intent to remain in 
the state of incarceration on release.”  Vaughn has expressed no intent to remain in New 
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offered no other evidence to rebut the presumption of Pennsylvania domicile, he has 
failed to carry his burden.  We will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Jersey upon his release, but reads Pierro as permitting him to rebut the presumption of 
Pennsylvania domicile by expressing his intent to reside in another state – Maine – 
following his incarceration.  He is mistaken.  Domicile requires both physical presence 
and intent to remain. 
